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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLEES5 REPLY BRIEF FAILS TO 
EXAMINE THE PENDING ISSUES 
A. Recharacterization of Claim 
Appellees seek to recharacterize their causes of action to eliminate their claims for 
affirmative relief. They now claim that their quiet title action sought to remove a cloud on 
their title which arose when the personal representative of Malu Hoopiiaina's estate 
conveyed deeds to Appellants. This mischaracterization is exposed when examining the quiet 
title causes of action in Appellee's Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint (R. 127) 
seeks to quiet the title in the two parcels and have that Property vested in Appellees. This 
is more than removing a cloud of title. The third cause of action is for damages for wrongful 
occupancy, money collected and punitive damages. The fourth cause of action is a claim for 
other trust assets. Each of these causes of action seeks "affirmative relief as defined by the 
Utah Supreme Court m Br anting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153 P 995 (1915); Davidsen 
v. Salt Lake City, 95 Utah 347, 81 P.2d 374,376 (1938); Dow v. Gilroy, 910 P.2d 1249 (Utah 
App. 1996); md American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757(Utah 1992). 
In this case, Appellees have asked for affirmative relief other than removal of a cloud from 
their title, by asking that title be vested in their name, invalidating the conveyance of the 
Property to Appellants in the probate of Malu Hoopiiaina, terminating the Lis Pendens filed 
by Appellants, invalidating the existing leases on the Property, and granting Appellees 
possession to the Property. (R. 132) When Appellees come to the court seeking this redress 
1 
against Appellants and seeking court orders to affectuate their demands, the Appellees are 
seeking "affirmative relief. 
When seeking "affirmative relief," the Appellees' claims are subject to the statute of 
limitations. If Appellees have failed to assert their claims before the expiration of the statute 
of limitations, they are not entitled to have their claims enforced by the courts. This Court 
is called upon to determine the applicability of the statutes of limitation and to remand the 
case to the trial court for findings of fact relating to the statutes of limitation. 
Appellees assert that the principal purpose of their quiet title action was to ". . . 
remove the void Personal Representatives' Deeds and Lis Pendens filed by Appellant." 
Response Brief, p. 8. However, there was nothing inappropriate, negative, or sinister about 
the Appellants' filing of the Lis Pendens. Under the Utah quite title statute, lis pendens can 
be filed by either party: 
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real 
property the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and the 
defendant at the time of filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed 
in such answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record with the recorder 
of the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated a notice of 
the pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, the object of 
the action or defense, and a description of the property in that county affected 
thereby. From the time of filing such notice for record only shall a purchaser 
or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed to have 
constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency 
against parties designated by their real names. [Emphasis added] 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 (1953). Appellants filed an Answer and Counterclaim to 
Appellees' Complaint and filed a lis pendens. (R. 200). Appellants' Counterclaim sought 
affirmative relief by asking the court to quiet title in the Property in Appellants. Since the 
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Appellants were specifically authorized by § 78-40-2 to file a lis pendens, there can be no 
implication of slander of title or any negative implication by such filing. 
B. Obiter Dictum 
Appellees have ignored the issue of "affirmative relief in their Response Brief. 
Appellees have sought to utilize the dictum from the Court of Appeal's opinion, indicating 
that the transfer of the Property to Appellants was "void and of no effect." Nolan v. 
Hoopiiaina, 2005 UT App 272, f^ 16. By relying on the Court of Appeals' statement, 
Appellees seek to limit the scope of this Court's review, by saying that ". . . [T]he issue of 
whether Plaintiffs' claims were a Quiet Title Action is now moot..." Response Brief p.5-6. 
This Court's power to review the Court of Appeals' opinion cannot be limited on the basis 
of dictum. The Utah Supreme Court has held in Watkiss & Saperstein v. Williams, 934 P.2d 
840, 850 (1996), " . . . language in an opinion which 'constitutes obiter dictum, [is] entirely 
unnecessary for the decision of the case . . . [and has] no effect as indicating the law of the 
District.'"1 
1
 This Court stated in Helper State Bank v. Crus, 95 Utah 320, 81 P.2d 359 
(1938): 
It has been held, many times, that the doctrine of the "law of the case" 
does not apply to expressions of opinion on questions the determination of 
which was not necessary for the decision, nor to the reasonings or illustrations 
in an opinion. Thus, it is said, in Herriman Irrigation Co. v. Keel, [25 Utah 
96, 69 P. 719] above cited, speaking of the "law of the case": 
"It does not apply to expressions of opinions on questions the 
disposition of which was not necessary for the decision, or to 
reasoning or illustrations in an opinion. . . . Nothing in a 
decision which is merely obiter dictum is controlled by the rule. 
. . . But upon all questions involved in the judgment the decision 
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The Court of Appeals' statement that the transfer of the Property by the personal 
representative was "void and of no effect" is entirely unnecessary for the decision and 
constitutes obiter dictum. The Court of Appeals was requested to determine the 
appropriateness of the summary judgment ruling entered by Judge Quinn of the Third 
of the appellate court is conclusive." 
Further on in the same case the court quoted from Barney v. Winona 
Railroad Co., 117 U.S. 228, 6 S. Ct. 654, 29 L. Ed. 858 -Mr. Justice Field 
delivering the opinion, as follows: 
11
 We said, however, that the grant of these additional sections 
might be regarded as one of quantity,—an inadvertence for 
which the writer of that opinion, who is also the writer of this 
one, is alone responsible. The statement was not at all material 
to the decision, which was that a deduction should have been 
made by reason of the intersection of the two grants, so far as 
the prior grant was located within the extension. We recognize 
the rule that what was decided in a case pending before us on 
appeal is not open to reconsideration in the same case, on a 
second appeal upon similar facts. The first decision is the law of 
the case, and must control its disposition; but the rule does not 
apply to expressions of opinion on matters the disposition of 
which was not required for the decision." 
And in Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 22 Utah 273, 61 P. 999, this court 
said: 
11
. . . . But this rule does not apply to the argument, or to 
expressions or illustrations in the argument that are obiter, and 
not pertinent nor required for a disposition of the particular 
question arising and decided in the case. The reasoning and 
illustrations do not constitute the decision." 
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Judicial District Court. There was no cross-appeal by Appellants pending before the Court 
of Appeals. The statement by the Court of Appeals that the transfer of the Property by the 
personal representative was "void and of no effect" was not a necessary ruling to the issue 
of the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals' ruling that the statute of limitations does 
not apply to quiet title actions is the holding of the case and is the basis for this appeal 
The appeal process is very strict about the questions that will be entertained on 
appeal. These questions must be raised in the Notice of Appeal or the docketing statement. 
This court, in Herriman Irrigation Company v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 69 P. 719, 721 (1902), 
stated: 
"On appeal, all questions to be determined must be raised by assignments of 
error, and in the appellate court only questions so raised can be presented and 
determined. . . . Before the appellate court can review the action of the trial 
court to determine a question such question must be raised by an assignment 
of error It is a general rule of practice in this court that all errors assigned, 
but not insisted upon in the appellant's brief, will be disregarded, and 
considered as waived and as raising no question for determination. Only such 
questions, therefore,... as are raised by assignment of error, and presented in 
the appellant's brief, are before the supreme court for determination." 
The Court of Appeals' decision goes beyond the stated issues pending on appeal. In 
Appellees' Docketing Statement, they list the issues pending on appeal as follows: 
1. Whether the Court erred by granting Summary Judgment in favor 
of Defendants where there were genuine issues of material fact as to when 
Plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the existence of the two Trusts. 
2. Whether the District Court erred in determining that the statute 
of limitations had expired on Plaintiffs' Complaint by reason of Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-1006 or § 78-12-25(3)(3 year statute of imitations) or § 78-12-25 
(4 year statute of limitations), and whether the District Court erred in applying 
the "Discovery Rule" relating to when Plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the 
Trusts and whether Defendants had concealed Plaintiffs' cause of action. 
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Appellees' Brief to the Court of Appeals never requested a finding that the personal 
representatives' deeds were null and void, that the Trusts were valid, that the Appellees were 
the owners of the Property, or whether Malu repudiated or breached the trust. None of these 
opinions were necessary for the Court of Appeals' decision and therefore, are dictum and are 
not binding on this Court or the trial court upon remand. 
C Stale Claim 
Appellees assert that the Appellants' deed and possession of the Property constitutes 
a "stale claim." This characterization, however, is inappropriate. It is Appellees whose 
claim is stale. A stale claim is defined as follows: 
A demand or claim that has long remained unasserted, one that is first asserted 
after an unexplained delay which is so long as to render it difficult or 
impossible for the court to ascertain the truth of the matters in controversy and 
do justice between the parties or as to create a presumption against the 
existence or the validity of the claim, or a presumption that the claim has been 
abandoned or satisfied. [Authority Omitted] . . . It implies a greater lapse of 
time than is necessary to "laches." [Authority Omitted] . . . The doctrine is 
purely an equitable one, and arises only when, from lapse of time and laches 
of Plaintiff, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights. 
[Authority Omitted]. 
H. Black, Blacks Law Dictionary, (1968), p. 1575-6. Appellees seek to utilize their 
mischaracterized classification of "stale claim" as a basis for the argument that the statute 
of limitation should not apply to quiet title actions because it ". . . would render property 
unmarketable if the apparent or stale claims could not be removed." Response Brief, p.6. 
Appellees make this comment without authority. However, the Court in Branting refutes 
these bare allegations which seek to undermine the applicability of the statute of limitations: 
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. . . If it be held that this is merely an action to remove a cloud from the title 
or to quiet the title to real estate, then respondent's counsel have found an easy 
way to avoid the plea of the statute of limitations as to all actions in which the 
plaintiffs real estate or some lien thereon may either directly or indirectly be 
involved. In other words, every kind or character of affirmative relief may be 
prayed for and obtained by a plaintiff or counterclaimant if such relief in some 
way affects his rights in or title to his real estate. There can be no doubt that 
this action was commenced for the purpose of invoking the aid of a court of 
equity to declare certain proceedings whereby a certain tax was assessed and 
levied against respondent's properly void and of no effect and to annul said 
proceedings. . . . 
Now, it must seem clear, to all who have given or will give the matter 
any consideration whatever, that if section 2883 [Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25] 
be denied application to a case like the one at bar, then the statute is practically 
repealed. That section applies to all actions for relief that is not otherwise 
covered by any other section. Where therefore affirmative relief is sought, as 
in this case, that section applies with full force. If that were not so, then all 
actions wherein it is sought to set aside any proceedings, judicial or otherwise, 
or any judgment of any court which may be a lien upon real property, may be 
prosecuted regardless of any statute of limitations. Although the respondent 
has, as a part of his prayer, asked to have removed the so-called cloud from his 
title, yet, as we have seen, the action was brought to annul certain proceedings, 
Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296 153 P. 995, 1000 (1915). Plaintiffs cannot avoid 
the statute of limitations by simply claiming that they are not seeking affirmative relief. 
There can be no doubt that Appellees initiated this action to have the court declare the 
personal representatives' deeds invalid, to change possession of the Property, and to issue 
deeds or orders vesting title of the Property in Appellees. These are each "affirmative relief 
Appellees seek from the courts. Such affirmative relief requires the imposition of the statute 
of limitations. 
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D. Applicability of "Affirmative Relief9 Cases 
Appellees' position is that". . . [t]he cases set forth by Appellants in their argument 
had no precedential relevance to the action before the court All other cases set forth by 
Appellants have no relevance to the statute of limitations on quiet title actions." Brief of 
Respondents, p.9. Appellees dismiss the precedent set forth in Branting, Davidsen, Dow, 
and American Tiara and ignore the "affirmative relief standard. The "affirmative relief 
standard is the measure established by the Supreme Court to determine whether the statute 
of limitations applies in quiet title actions. To ignore this standard denies the Appellants the 
measured consistency of Utah Supreme Court rulings. It appears in this case that the Court 
of Appeals exceeded the scope of its task and rather than simply focusing on the issues 
pending on appeal, the appropriateness of the summary judgment entered by Judge Quinn 
in the Third District Court, sought to resolve legal issues and make a determination that 
would dispose of the entire case. Rather than address the issues of the statutes of limitations 
which was the basis of the trial court's summary judgment, the Court of Appeals negated the 
statutes of limitations issues and addressed legal issues not briefed or presented to then. In 
this appeal, Appellees have assumed a position similar to the Court of Appeals', ignoring the 
statute of limitations and seeking to limit the scope of this appeal by claiming that opinions 
expressed by the Court of Appeals in dictum constitute the law of the case. Appellees have 
failed to distinguish the cases establishing "affirmative relief as the trigger for the statute 
of limitations. Appellees seem to assert that since the "principle purpose" of their actions 
was not to obtain some "affirmative relief," and therefore "affirmative relief" standard is 
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inapplicable. However, Appellees' discussion of the causes of action asserted in their 
Amended Complaint verify and reinforce that Appellees' purpose in bringing the action was 
not simply to remove a cloud against the title of the Property, but was to change the 
possession and title owner of the Property. Appellees' desire for an accounting of 
Appellants' receipt and disbursement of income from the Property constitutes "affirmative 
relief." Likewise, the return of personal property, or payment of its value, is affirmative 
relief, not simply "seeking to avoid apparent or stale claims." Appellees' claims have always 
sought the intervention of the court, on their behalf, to validate their claim to the Property, 
to grant them possession, to give them an accounting, and to return or pay for personal 
property. Every one of these claims seeks "affirmative relief from the courts. It is clear that 
the principle purpose for the Appellees' action was for "affirmative relief." The cases cited 
by Appellants are binding on the adjudication of these issues and the statutes of limitation 
apply. 
E. Presumption of Application of Statute of Limitations 
Based on the statutes of limitation and case law, there appears to be a presumption 
that the statute of limitations applies to all actions in the state of Utah. By its terms, Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) states that "an action may be brought within four years for relief 
not otherwise provided by law." The negative implication of this statute is that if any action 
which is not specifically provided for in another statute of limitations, is brought more than 
four years after the cause of action accrues, the action is barred by §78-12-25(3). The 
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presumption that the statute of limitations applies all cases is further supported by this 
Court's holding in American Tierra: 
Having concluded that the subdivides' claims are equitable and not 
barred for failure to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, we 
must determine whether they are nonetheless barred by a statute of limitation. 
Historically, courts of equity were not bound by statutes of limitation. See, 
e.g., Patterson v. Hewitt, 49 L. Ed. 214, 195 U.S. 309, 317, 25 S.Ct. 35 
(1904). Today, however, many jurisdictions have commingled legal and 
equitable remedies in one form of action. In these jurisdictions, "the 
applicability of statutes of limitation to equitable proceedings appears to be 
unquestioned." 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 157 , at 693 (1966). Utah is one of 
those jurisdictions that long ago commingled legal and equitable actions. See 
Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1987) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 
2). Moreover, years before Utah merged its legal and equitable systems, Utah 
applied statutes of limitation to equitable actions. See, e.g., Fullerton v. Bailey, 
53 P. 1020, 17 Utah 85 (1898). We therefore must determine which statute of 
limitation applies to this action. 
Frequently, actions in equity are held to come within the scope of the 
statutory provision that establishes a time limit applicable to all causes of 
action for which a specific limit is not otherwise provided. 27 Am. Jur. 2d 
Equity §157 , at 693 (1966). Utah's catch-all provision places a four-year 
limitation period on actions "not otherwise provided for by law." Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-25(3). 
This court previously has applied the predecessor of §78-12-25(3) to 
equitable actions. For instance, in Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 
153 P. 995 (Utah 1915), the plaintiff brought an equitable action seeking 
nullification of a municipal ordinance that ordered the construction of a sewer 
and the assessment of a special tax on abutting property. 153 P. at 996. As 
a defense, the city interposed section 2833 of the Compiled Laws of 1907, 
which required, "An action for relief not herein before provided for must be 
commenced within four years after the cause of action shall have accrued." 
153 P. at 1000. We concluded that section 2833 applied to all actions, both 
legal and equitable, in which affirmative relief is sought. Because more than 
four years had elapsed since the claim accrued, the catch-all provision barred 
the claim. See 153 P. at 1001; accord Fullerton v. Bailey, 17 Utah at 93. 
Again, in Brown v. Cleverly, 93 Utah 54, 70 P.2d 881 (Utah 1937), we applied 
Utah's four-year catch-all statute of limitation to preclude a claim for an 
equitable lien. 70 P.2d at 885. Before applying the catch-all statute to this 
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case, however, we must satisfy ourselves that Utah's current statutes of 
limitation do not contain a more specific provision that should cover the 
instant case. 
American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757,760 (1992). It appears that this 
Court and the Utah statutes presume that the statutes of limitations are applicable in all 
actions brought before Utah courts. In the case of quiet title actions, there is an exception 
when the plaintiff seeks only to clear an apparent or stale claim where no affirmative relief 
is sought. 
Since the Appellees in this case are seeking "affirmative relief," the statute of 
limitations is applicable to determine the timeliness of Appellees' filing of their quiet title 
actions. The Appellees therefore have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the 
statute of limitations applies to their claim by demonstrating that they do not seek 
"affirmative relief." 
POINT II 
CERTIORARI WAS GRANTED ON THE ISSUE OF 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, INCLUDING ITS 
APPLICABILITY TO THE TRUST 
Appellees have assert that the Writ of Certiorari granted by this Court does not extend 
to the issue of an irrevocable trust who breaches his trust. Appellants have briefed the 
applicability of the statute of limitations to the breaching trustee believing that the statute of 
limitations applies as part of the quiet title action. There is no separate cause of action 
relating to the trustee's breach and repudiation of the irrevocable trust. Appellees assert two 
causes of action for quiet title. The Court of Appeals found that the Appellees ". . . were 
primarily seeking to remove the cloud of Cuma's deed of the real property . . .." Nolan v. 
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Hoopiiaina, 2005 UT App. 272, ]fl9. To Appellants, this action is a quiet title action. 
Quieting title in Appellees was a condition precedent for the pursuit and effectuation of the 
other causes of action. There is no separate cause of action relating to the trustee's breach 
and the trustee's breach arises incidental to the quiet title claim. On this basis, Appellants 
believe that the applicability of the statute of limitations to a trustee breaching his irrevocable 
trust is part and parcel of the overriding quiet title action. Therefore, Appellant briefs the 
statute of limitations issue as it applies to a breaching trustee of an irrevocable trust. 
Appellees have chosen not to address this issue in their reply brief Nevertheless, the 
Court of Appeals' conclusion that the trustee "had no power to revoke the trusts and deal 
with the trusts' assets as provided in the trust instruments," Nolan, at [^15, is legally 
unsustainable because it fails to recognize the well-established doctrines of repudiation and 
breach of the trust by the trustee. When the quiet title claim of the beneficiaries is against 
third parties, not members of the trust, then the statute of limitations is applicable to the quiet 
title action. Jenkins v Jenkins, 24 Utah 108, 66 P.773, 778 (1901) ("the rule that the statute 
of limitations does not bar a trust estate holds only between cestui que trust and trustee, not 
between cestui que trust on one side, and strangers on the other; for that would make the 
statute [of limitations] of no force at all . . . ."). The Court of Appeals decision ignores 
Appellant's assertion of repudiation and breach of irrevocable trust which directly affects the 
Appellant's rights in the quiet title action. If Malu's breach of the irrevocable trusts occurred 
with the knowledge of the Trustees, the Appellees' quiet title action may be barred. 
Appellees have not had the opportunity to develop the factual issues relating to repudiation 
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and breach of trust and as defenses to Appellees' quiet title action. The Appellants should 
be able to assert repudiation and breach of the trust agreement as defenses in any further 
proceedings of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellees' response brief is based on avoidance and denial. This Court has 
established the "affirmative relief standard to determine whether the statute of limitations 
applies in quiet title actions. Appellees' Complaint and Amended Complaint seek 
"affirmative relief in every cause of action asserted. The Appellees seek to have the courts 
invalidate the personal representatives' deeds conveying the property to Appellants, vest the 
title of the property in Appellees, grant possession of the property to Appellees, invalidate 
the leases on the Property, receive an accounting from Appellants of income and 
distributions relating to the Property, and account for trust property or its equivalent value. 
These remedies each constitute "affirmative relief and require affirmative orders and action 
form the courts. In this case, the Supreme Court is not limited in its decision by the dictum 
of the Court of Appeals. The "affirmative relief standard established by this Court in 
Br anting is still the measure of whether the statute of limitations is applicable in quiet title 
actions. Because the Appellees seek "affirmative relief," the statute of limitations is 
applicable. In this quiet title action, the statute of limitations is also applicable to the 
trustee's repudiation and breach of an irrevocable trust. This Court should remand this quiet 
title action case to the trial court mandating the applicability of the statute of limitations. 
13 
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